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The objective of this paper is to show how the same market failures that contribute to urban 
sprawl also contribute to urban blight. The paper develops a simple dynamic model in which 
new suburban and older central-city properties compete for mobile residents. The level of 
housing services generated by older properties depends on current maintenance or reinvest-
ment expenditures. In this setting, market failures that reduce the cost of occupying suburban 
locations, thus leading to excessive suburban development, also depress central-city housing 
prices and undermine maintenance incentives, leading to deficient levels of central-city rein-
vestment. Corrective policies that shift population from the suburbs to the center result in 
higher levels of reinvestment in central-city housing, therefore reducing blight. 
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1. Introduction
Urban sprawl has become a major public policy issue in recent years, reﬂecting widespread
complaintsthat the spatial growth of citiesis“paving over”the Americanlandscape in a fashion
that is undesirable on environmental and aesthetic grounds.1 In response to these concerns,
many cities and states have adopted policies to limit sprawl, including various restrictions on
development at the urban fringe, new charges levied on builders, and public purchases of open
space.
Many commentators recognize that sprawl is in part caused by the growing populations
of US cities and their rising incomes, both of which increase the derived demand for land. In
addition, highway investment and growing automobile ownership are viewed as contributing
to sprawl by reducing the cost of access to employment centers from suburban locations (see
Glaeser and Kahn (2004) and Baum-Snow (2007)).2 While such fundamental forces naturally
lead to urban spatial expansion, economists argue that sprawl can be faulted on eﬃciency
grounds only if the operation of these forces involves market failures. Several market failures
have indeed been identiﬁed, including unpriced traﬃc congestion, failure to account for open-
space amenitiesin development decisions, and failure to levy marginal-cost-based infrastructure
charges (see Brueckner (2000, 2001)). With unpriced congestion, the social cost of commuting
exceeds the private cost, and the equilibrium urban development pattern features excessively
long commute trips and thus a city that is too spread out. When open-space amenities are
present or when infrastructure is underpriced, the social cost of suburban land development
exceeds the private cost faced by builders, again leading to ineﬃcient urban expansion.
The objectiveof this paper is to show that the same market failuresthat contribute to urban
sprawl also contribute to urban blight. More precisely, our objective is to show that urban
sprawl, deﬁned as excessive investment in new suburban properties, and urban blight, deﬁned
1as deﬁcient reinvestment in older central city properties, result from the same underlying
economic process. To achieve this goal, the paper develops a simple dynamic model of an urban
economy in which new suburban properties and older central-cityproperties compete for mobile
residents. In the model, the production of housing services from existing structures depends,
in part, on maintenance or reinvestment expenditures. Then, with unpriced traﬃc congestion,
underpriced infrastructure provision, or open-space amenities, both sprawl and blight arise
from the natural operation of the land market: the cost of suburban living is ineﬃciently
low, which distorts the allocation of population, drawing residents away from the downtown.
This population shift in turn depresses housing prices in the center and undermines incentives
to maintain or reinvest in existing structures. Under each market failure, the appropriate
corrective policy shifts population toward the city center, improving maintenance incentives
and reducing urban blight. The analysis thus demonstrates that blight reduction is a beneﬁcial
byproduct of policies designed to control urban sprawl.
Early writers on blight and urban renewal were clearly aware of the possibility of complex
relationships between central-city and suburban development. For example, Fisher (1942, pp.
334-5), writing in the American Economic Review, notes that improvements in transportation
technology greatly expanded the land area accessible from the center of a city, resulting in a
“great suburban migration” and the emergence of blight:
This migration embraces not only residential land uses but commercial as well, and
there are some indications that industrial land uses are falling into the line of march
away from ‘downtown’ congestion, high taxes, high land ‘values,’ and restricted areas
to the open spaces of ‘suburbia’ This accelerating march to the periphery of urban
areas has greatly accentuated the problem of the areas lying near the center of cities
... The areas which are thus being drained of their population and purchasing power
are lumped together and called ‘blighted’ ... the structures in the area are progressively
deteriorating ... new capital is ﬂeeing from or refusing to enter the area.
Similar concerns are expressed by contemporary critics of sprawl; see, for example, Richardson
and Gordon (2001) and Nelson et al. (2004).
Several other independent mechanisms also contribute to the problem urban blight. The
most obvious, and presumably most important, is central-city poverty. A number of forces
2make central cities the best location for poor households (see Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport
(2008)), and the resulting low incomes of many central neighborhoods generate low housing
qualities via the ﬁltering process (see Braid (1986) and Bond and Coulson (1989)). Another
key mechanism, and the dominant issue in early studies of urban renewal, is externalities
between properties. These “neighborhood eﬀects,” which inﬂuence individual maintenance
and reinvestment decisions, can lead to a process of contagious neighborhood decline (see
Davis (1960), Davis and Whinston (1961)). Bradbury, Downs and Small (1980, pp. 412)
summarize the process as follows:
If one unit is severely damaged ... or left vacant for an extended period ..., it detracts
from the desirability of the entire neighborhood. The subsequent demand reduction
in turn reduces the proﬁtability of landlords’ maintenance eﬀorts. Additional units
will run down, and may even be abandoned, and the demand for neighborhood units
falls further in response. In this way, physical blight and abandonment are contagious
through a process of self-fulﬁlling expectations.
Under this view, blight arises from the interaction of neighborhood externalities and an
exogenous event causing an initial decline in maintenance or reinvestment for some properties.3
The present analysis argues that such an exogenous trigger is unnecessary, with blight arising
instead from the natural operation of the land market in the presence of sprawl-generating
market failures. It would be possible to add neighborhood eﬀects to the process that determines
maintenance levelsin the model, and this change would certainly amplify the impacts of market
failures. The model’s key diﬀerence, however, is that the initial impetus to underinvestment in
central properties is an endogenous and ineﬃcient response to market failures emanating from
other sectors of the urban economy.
There are two other large literatures that bear on the relationship between suburban devel-
opment and blight. First, the “spatial mismatch” literature argues that the suburbanization of
jobs, coupled with discrimination in suburban labor, housing and mortgage markets, has con-
tributed to the concentration and persistence of minority poverty (and hence blight) in central
cities (see Kain (1968, 1992), Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1990)). Second, the “ﬂight from blight”
explanation of post-war US suburbanization has emphasized that the process of decentraliza-
tion was encouraged by a desire on the part of aﬄuent households to escape central-city crime,
3poverty, racial tensions, schools, taxes, congestion and pollution (see Bradford and Kelejian
(1973), Mills and Price (1984), Mieszkowski and Mills (1993), Cullen and Levitt (1999)). In
contrast to these views, blight does not cause sprawl in the present model: both are equilibrium
responses to more-primitive market failures.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model, assuming the absence of
any of the three market failures (referred to henceforth as “distortions”). Section 3 sequen-
tially incorporates each of the distortions, analyzes the divergence between the social optimum
and laissez-faire equilibrium, and derives the appropriate corrective policy. These policies are
congestion pricing, an open-space amenity tax, and a marginal-cost-based impact fee for infras-
tructure, and the analysis reveals their impacts on sprawl and blight.4 Section 4 asks whether
a quantity-based anti-sprawl policy (an urban growth boundary) can be used in place of sec-
tion 3’s price-based policies to achieve the social optimum. Section 5 provides some additional
comparative-static results, and section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. The setup
The model has two periods, denoted 1 and 2, and it focuses on a closed city experiencing
population growth between the periods. For simplicity, diﬀerentiation of space in the city is
limited to two zones, with commuting costs homogeneous within each zone. A central zone,
whose land area is normalized to unity, contains the CBD at its left end. Since intrazonal
commuting is assumed to be costless, the cost of traveling to the CBD from any location
within the central zone equals zero. A suburban zone, which contains ` worth of potentially
developable land, is connected to the central zone by a congestible bridge. Figure 1 illustrates
the city’s spatial structure.5
Since intrazonal commuting is costless, commuting cost from the suburbs to the CBD is
simply equal to the cost of crossing the bridge. For each commuter, this cost is given by a
function t, which depends on the number of commuters crossing the bridge. In the absence
of congestion, this function is simply a constant, with costs independent of the traﬃc volume.
When congestion is introduced in section 3.1 below, the function acquires a traﬃc-volume
4argument.
Structures in the city are built at a ﬁxed density, which cannot be altered between periods.
However, structures built in period 1 are subject to quality deterioration between the periods,
with the extent of this depreciation determined by the level of reinvestment, in the form
of maintenance or reinvestment expenditures, in period 2. Speciﬁcally, structures provide β
square feet of housing per unit of land, with β normalized to one for simplicity. Again for
simplicity, the construction cost of c per unit of land, which equals a constant given ﬁxed
density, is set at zero. When new, each square foot of housing provides one unit of housing
services, while services per square foot equal a in a structure that is one period old. Without
any reinvestment expenditure, a = a < 1. But a higher service level of a > a can be achieved
by a reinvestment expenditure of k(a) per square foot, where k(a) = 0, k0 > 0, and k00 ≥ 0
(with β = 1, k(a) also gives reinvestment cost per unit of land). Thus, the cost of quality
improvement in an old structure rises with the target housing-service level and does so at a
nondecreasing rate. Some level of reinvestment expenditure would presumably achieve like-
new quality (with a = 1) or perhaps even better-than-new quality (a > 1), but the ensuing
discussion presumes that a value satisfying a < a < 1 is chosen. The key observation is that,
since urban blight is associated with a low level of building reinvestment, public policies that
induce an increase in a serve to reduce blight.
Consumer preferences depend on consumption of a non-housing numeraire good, denoted
e, and housing services, denoted Q. Letting q denote housing square footage, Q = q holds in
new housing (with services identically equal to ﬂoor space), while Q = aq holds for housing in a
one-period-old building. Note that the level of q (housing quantity) is chosen by the consumer,
while the builder chooses a (which determines housing quality). For simplicity, preferences are
assumed to be quasi-linear, with the utility function given by U(e,Q) ≡ e+v(Q), where v0 > 0
and v00 < 0. The consequences of relaxing this assumption, which eliminates income eﬀects on
housing consumption, are discussed below.
The entire central zone is assumed to be developed in period 1, with no spillover to the
suburban zone. Suburban development then occurs in period 2, following growth in the city’s
population. Thus, the period-2 city inherits a ﬁxed stock of housing in the central zone, which
5is subject to quality deterioration. Note that the city’s population in period 1 must have the
right size in order the exactly ﬁll the central zone, and that the required size might depend
on period-2 policies, which can aﬀect period-1 housing prices (and thus period-1 consumption
and population density) in an intemporal setting. However, as long as the central zone is fully
developed in period 1, these population-size issues are irrelevant to the outcomes in period 2,
which are the focus of the analysis. Thus, no further consideration of period 1 is necessary.
2.2. Period-2 analysis
In period 2, the city has a population of N, part of which must accommodated in the
suburban zone. The suburban population equals ns, while the population of the central zone
equals nc, with nc + ns = N. To characterize suburban development, which ﬁrst occurs in
period 2, let qs and ps denote the suburban quantity of housing in period 2 and its price per
square foot, with rs denoting suburban land rent. Let r denote the opportunity cost of land.
Then, the builder’s period-2 proﬁt per unit of land is equal to πs ≡ βps − c − rs = ps − rs,
recalling β = 1 and c = 0. Competition among builders forces proﬁt to zero, so that ps = rs,
and competition among landowners forces land rent down to its opportunity cost of r. The
suburban price per square foot of housing then equals this opportunity cost, with ps = r.
Letting y denote income, the consumer budget constraint in the suburban zone is given
by es + rqs = y − t, where es is suburban non-housing consumption and t is again commuting
cost. Eliminating es in the utility function es + v(qs), the ﬁrst-order condition for choice of qs
is then
v0(qs) = r. (1)
Let qc and pc denote the quantity of housing and its price per square foot in the central
zone in period 2. With commuting cost equal to zero, the consumer budget constraint is then
ec + pcqc = y, and utility can be written y − pcqc + v(aqc). Note that, since buildings are now
one period old in the central zone, each square foot of housing only generates a units of housing
services. Diﬀerentiating, the ﬁrst-order condition for choice of qc is given by av0(aqc) = pc, or
v0(aqc) = pc/a. (2)
6To interpret (2), note that pc/a equals the price per unit of housing services in an old dwelling,
given by price per square foot (pc) divided by services per square foot (a). Thus, (2) equates
the marginal valuation of housing services in an old dwelling to the relevant price. Observe
that, unlike in the suburban zone, the price pc will reﬂect an endogenous locational premium
and is thus not equal to land’s opportunity cost.
Two additional equilibrium conditions provide linkages across the central and suburban
zones. The ﬁrst condition relates the suburban population to housing quantity in the center.
Letting nc denote the period-2 population of the central zone, total land consumption is ncqc,
and setting this expression equal to the zone’s unitary land area yields nc = 1/qc. But since
nc + ns = N, it follows that
ns = N − 1/qc. (3)
The second condition requires equalization of consumer utilities between the center and sub-
urbs, and it is written y − pcqc + v(aqc) = y − t − rqs + v(qs), or after canceling the y’s,
v(aqc) − pcqc = v(qs) − rqs − t (4)
Conditional on a, the conditions (1)–(4) jointly determine equilibrium values of qs, qc,
pc, and ns. However, a is endogenous and set by the builder. In the center, the builder’s
period-2 proﬁt per unit of land is equal to πc ≡ pc − rc − k(a), and a is chosen to maximize
this expression (rc is central land rent). In maximizing, the builder expects that consumers
will pay more for better housing quality, with a higher a allowing a higher pc to be charged.
This expectation is based on “utility-taking” behavior, with an individual builder recognizing
his inability to inﬂuence the equilibrium utility achieved by the consumer. As a result, the
builder treats consumer utility as ﬁxed, satisfying y − pcqc + v(aqc) = u for some given u. To



















Thus, the builder expects an increase in a to raise pc at a rate equal to the marginal valuation
of housing services, a natural conclusion.
Finally, maximization of the proﬁt expression πc requires ∂pc/∂a − k0(a) = 0, and using
(6), this condition reduces to
v0(aqc) = k0(a). (7)
Thus, at the optimal a, the marginal valuation of services is set equal to the marginal cost of
raising housing quality. Note that since locations within the central zone are homogeneous,
builders at all locations choose the same a value. Eq. (7) along with (1)–(4) then together
determine equilibrium values for qs, qc, pc, ns, and a. The ﬁnal unknown, the central land rent
variable rc, is determined residually by the builder’s zero-proﬁt condition. Lastly, suburban
development is assumed to leave some open space, with the developed land area (given by
nsqs) less than the area ` of the suburban zone, as shown in Figure 1.
In the standard urban model, housing prices are higher in the center than in the suburbs,
and housing consumption is lower. Similar results hold in the present model, adjusted to
account for the presence of housing quality diﬀerences between the zones. To derive these
results, let the utility expresson on the LHS of (4) be rewritten as y − PcQc + v(Qc), where
Pc = pc/a is the central price per unit of housing services and Qc = aqc. As seen above, the
central-zone consumer maximizes this expression with respect to Qc (by choosing qc), satisfying
(2). Let the maximized value, which gives the indirect utility function, be written y + f(Pc),
where f0(·) < 0. Similarly, indirect utility for a suburban resident (the maximized value of the
RHS of (4)) is given by y−t+f(r). Equalization of utilitiesin (4) then requiresf(r)−f(Pc) = t,
which in turn implies Pc > r given f0 < 0. Thus, the price per unit of housing services must
be higher in the central zone than in the suburbs (where it equals r). Since consumption
is decreasing in the relevant price from the ﬁrst-order conditions (1) and (2), it follows that
8Qc = aqc < qs, so that consumption of housing services is lower in the central zone than in
the suburbs. Note that with a < 1, this inequality need not imply qc < qs, and the inequality
Pc > r similarly need not imply pc > r. So housing consumption and price, unadjusted for
quality diﬀerences, need not exhibit the usual central-suburban variation, although the usual
pattern may emerge when a is close to unity.
The analysis so far has been silent about land ownership arrangements in the economy.
The reason is that, with quasi-linear preferences, the equilibrium does not depend on the
nature of such arrangements. On the one hand, when the land in the two zones is owned
by absentee landowners, rental income ﬂows out of the city and thus does not appear in any
of the equilibrium conditions. Under resident landownership, by contrast, the rental income
from the two zones accrues to the urban residents, with equal per capita division being a
common assumption. In this case, consumer income y is supplemented by rental income term
R, aﬀecting only eq. (4) among the equilibrium conditions. But since R cancels from both sides
of this condition, the resulting equilibrium is the same as in the case of absentee ownership
(where R = 0). This convenient property of the quasi-linear case is also useful in the ensuing
analysis of anti-sprawl policies. As will be seen, the government revenue generated by these
policies must be redistributed, and the pattern of such redistribution is irrelevant to their
impacts under this form of preferences.
3. Sprawl-Inducing Distortions and the Blight Impacts of Corrective
Policies
This section of the paper adds three diﬀerent sprawl-inducing distortions to the urban
economy: unpriced traﬃc congestion, failure to account for the amenity value of open space,
and average- rather than marginal-cost pricing of infrastructure. As explained in the intro-
duction, it is well known that each of these distortions generates urban sprawl, which in the
present context means an excessive suburban population, with too few residents in the central
zone. In each case, the appropriate corrective policy reduces sprawl by shifting population
toward the center. But given presence of endogenous building reinvestment in the model, this
population shift will be accompanied by a blight impact. The purpose of the ensuing analysis
is to analyze these blight impacts, looking separately at the three diﬀerent distortions and
9their associated corrective policies. As noted in the introduction, the three corrective policies
are congestion pricing, an open-space amenity tax, and impact fees.
For each distortion, the equilibrium conditions from section 2 are ﬁrst modiﬁed to incor-
porate the distortion. Then, the planning problem for the urban economy is solved to ﬁnd the
social optimum and the corrective policy required to support it. Comparison of the original,
laissez-faire equilibrium and one generated by the corrective policy reveals the ways in which
the original urban economy diverges from the social optimum. The analysis shows that, un-
der each distortion, the suburban population is excessive, with imposition of the appropriate
corrective policy shifting population toward the central zone. In addition, the analysis reveals
ineﬃciencies in the level of reinvestment in central-city buildings, showing the impact of the
corrective policies on urban blight.
3.1. Traﬃc congestion and the need for congestion pricing
With traﬃc congestion, the cost of crossing the bridge linking the suburbs to the center,
which was previously a constant, becomes a function of the number of suburban commuters.
Since this number equals ns, the suburban population, the cost is written t(ns), where t0 > 0.
With this change, the laissez-faire equilibrium conditions (1)–(4) and (7) from section 2 are
modiﬁed in a simple fashion: the constant t in (4) is replaced by t(ns).
While the laissez-faire equilibrium in the absence of congestion is eﬃcient, congestion cre-
ates an externality and thus leads to ineﬃciency. In particular, when an additional commuter
uses the bridge, total commuting cost for existing users rises by nst0(ns) (their number times
the increase in individual cost), an external eﬀect that is ignored by each commuter. Intuition
suggests that, to maximize social welfare, each commuter should be charged a congestion toll
equal to this expression, leading to internalization of the externality.
This intuition can be veriﬁed by analyzing the optimization problem that would be solved
by a social planner. In period 2, the planner would seek to minimize the city’s resource
usage subject to achievement of a ﬁxed, common utility level for the central and suburban
residents (unequal zone utilitieswould be unsustainable under free migration). The Lagrangian
10expression for this problem is
(N − ns)ec + nses + r(1 + nsqs) + nst(ns) + k(a)
+ λ(ec + v(aqc) − u)
+ µ(es + v(qs) − u)
+ ρ([N − ns]qc − 1). (8)
The second and third lines of (8) contain the utility constraints, while population constraint
in the last line replicates (3). The resource expression in the ﬁrst line of (8) aggregates total
non-housing consumption (the ﬁrst two terms), the opportunity cost of the land used by the
city (the third term), total commuting cost, and reinvestment cost. Note that k(a), which
gives cost per unit of land, is multiplied by the unitary land area of the central zone.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the e variables yield −λ = N − ns and −µ = ns, and after
substitution in the ﬁrst-order conditions for the q variables, these conditions reduce to (1) and
av0(aqc) = ρ, where ρ represents the shadow price of central housing. After eliminating λ
and using the last constraint in (8), the ﬁrst-order condition for a reduces to (7). Finally, the
ﬁrst-order condition for ns reduces to
ec + ρqc = es + rqs + t(ns) + nst0(ns), (9)
which says the resource cost of locating an additional individual should be equated across
zones. Eliminating ec and es using the utility constraints from (8), and then cancelling the u’s
and rearranging, (9) reduces to
v(aqc) − ρqc = v(qs) − rqs − t(ns) − nst0(ns). (10)
A comparison with (4) shows that (10) is just a modiﬁed version of the laissez-faire equal-
utility condition. The modiﬁcations are the appearance of ρ in place of pc on the LHS, and
11the subtraction of nst0(ns) on the RHS. Since, from above, the remaining optimality condi-
tions coincide with the laissez-faire equilibrium conditions (1), (2), (3) and (7), it follows that
the social optimum coincides with the equilibrium generated when consumers are charged an
amount nst0(ns) over and above their private cost of commuting, t(ns). Thus, the social opti-
mum emerges as an equilibrium when commuters are charged the appropriate congestion toll.
Note that the shadow price ρ is replaced by the market price pc in this reinterpretation of
the optimality conditions. Observe also that the parametric utility level u from (8), which
does not appear in this set of conditions, serves only to determine the levels of nonhousing
consumption, ec and es, which are not a focus of the analysis.
3.2. The eﬀects of congestion pricing
To analyze the eﬀects of congestion pricing, ρ is ﬁrst replaced by pc in (10), with pc then
replaced by av0(aqc) using (2). The condition (10) then becomes
v(aqc) − aqcv0(aqc) = v(qs) − rqs − t(ns) − nst0(ns). (11)
Note that ﬁrst-order condition v0(qs) = r from (1), which applies with or without congestion
pricing, requires that qs is equal to some constant, implying that v(qs) − rqs in (11) equals a
common constant in both cases. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, however, nst0(ns) is deleted
from the RHS of (11).
Using (11) along with the other conditions, the following results can be established:
Proposition 1. In the presence of traﬃc congestion, the laissez-faire equilibrium has
a lower level of reinvestment in central-city buildings and a larger suburban population
than the social optimum. Thus, imposition of congestion pricing, which achieves the
optimum, raises reinvestment (reducing urban blight) while shifting population toward
the center.
Proof: Let the laissez-faire solutions be denoted by hats and the solutions under congestion
pricing (at the social optimum) be denoted by stars. Proceeding by contradiction, suppose that
n∗
s ≥ b ns. Then, given t0 > 0, t(n∗
s) +n∗
st0(n∗
s) > t(b ns) holds, so that the RHS of (11) is smaller
under congestion pricing than in the laissez-faire case. The LHS expression in (11) must then
12also be smaller, yielding a∗q∗
c < b ab qc given that v(z) −zv0(z) is an increasing function of z (its
derivative is −zv00 > 0). But with n∗
s ≥ b ns, (3) implies q∗
c ≥ b qc. Then, for a∗q∗
c < b ab qc to hold,
a∗ < b a must be satisﬁed as well. Given k00 ≥ 0, it then follows that k0(a∗) ≤ k0(b a), so that
satisfaction of (7) in both cases would require v0(a∗q∗
c) ≤ v0(b ab qc), or a∗q∗
c ≥ b ab qc given v00 < 0.
This contradition rules out the premise on ns, establishing n∗
s < b ns and q∗
c < b qc, using (3).
Then, a∗ > b a must be satisﬁed since otherwise a∗q∗
c < b ab qc would hold, implying k0(a∗) ≤ k0(b a)
and v0(a∗q∗
c) > v0(b ab qc), which rule out satisfaction of (7) in the two cases. Finally, combining
(2) and (7) yields pc/a = k0(a) or pc = ak0(a), and with a∗ > b a, p∗
c > b pc holds, so that pc is
higher under congestion pricing.
Thus, in addition to raising a (lowering ns) from an ineﬃciently low (ineﬃciently high)
level, imposition of congestion pricing raises the central housing price pc. An intuitive ex-
planation for the higher level of reinvestment comes from focusing on this pc impact. With
congestion pricing raising the cost of suburban commuting, population must shift toward the
center, and since the total square feet of housing available in the center is ﬁxed, the price per
square foot pc must then rise. Holding a constant, this increase raises the price per unit of
housing services pc/a, which is set equal to the marginal valuation v0(aqc) of services under
consumer optimization. But with the builder setting a to equate this marginal valuation to
k0(a) from (7), pc/a and k0(a) must then be equalized, which requires a higher a given the
higher pc. Thus, the higher housing price per square foot in the center generated by congestion
pricing elicits greater spending on housing quality, reducing urban blight.
As noted earlier, the equilibrium under congestion pricing is unaﬀected by the disposition
of the revenue collected from the congestion toll, which equals n2
st0(ns). If the toll revenue
were distributed to consumers in both zones in an equal per capita fashion,6 the resulting
amount would cancel from both sides of the equal-utility condition, leaving the previous results
unaﬀected. Similarly, the same equilibrium would arise if the revenue were retained by the
government or paid to absentee landowners.
Another question concerns the extent to which the above results depend on the absence of
income eﬀects, which are eliminated by the assumption of quasi-linear preferences. Analysis
using a general utility function is diﬃcult, but this question can be addressed by imposing the
13familiar Cobb-Douglas form for preferences. It can be shown that all of the preceding impacts
of congestion pricing again emerge in the Cobb-Douglas case, suggesting that the above results
may be robust to relaxation of the key assumption on preferences.7
3.3. The eﬀects of an open-space amenity tax
Suppose that traﬃc congestion is again absent, as in section 2, but that the open space
surrounding the city generates an amenity for each resident. Accordingly, let the utility func-
tion be rewritten as e + v(Q) + θ(` − nsqs), where the amount of open space equals ` − nsqs,
and the marginal valuation of such space is given by the parameter θ ≥ 0.8 See Bento et al.
(2006) for an analysis using this same approach to valuing open space.
With these changes, the planning problem from section 3.1 is modiﬁed by inclusion of the
additional open-space term in the two utility constraints in the second and third lines of (8).
Then, the optimality condition for qs, which was previously v0(qs) = r, becomes
v0(qs) = r + θN. (12)
The reason is that, in addition to its opportunity cost, consumption of an extra unit of suburban
land now generates a utility loss of θ for each of the city’s N residents. In the optimality/equal-
utility condition (10), rqs is replaced by (r+θN)qs, and the commuting-cost terms are replaced
by a constant t (pc again replaces ρ). Note that, in generating this condition from (9), the
open-space utility terms cancel.
The optimum can be decentralized by levying an open-space amenity tax equal to θN on
each unit of developed suburban land. A builder’s cost per unit of land is then r + θN, and
competition forces the suburban housing price ps down to this level. The RHS of (1), the
consumer ﬁrst-order condition for choice of qs, then becomes r +θN, matching the optimality
condition in (12).
In the open-space amenity case, (11) is rewritten as
v(aqc) − aqcv0(aqc) = v(qs) − (r + θN)qs − t, (13)
14which reduces to the laissez-faire condition (4) when θ = 0. However, since v0(qs) is set equal
to r + θN in either case, (13) can be rewritten as
v(aqc) − aqcv0(aqc) = v(qs) − qsv0(qs) − t, (14)
which applies both under the amenity tax and at the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Using (14) along with the other conditions, the following results can be established:
Proposition 2. Suppose the marginal cost of housing quality is increasing. Then, in
the presence of open-space amenities, the laissez-faire equilibrium has a lower level of
reinvestment in central-city buildings and a larger suburban population than the social
optimum. Thus, imposition of an open-space amenity tax, which achieves the optimum,
raises reinvestment (reducing urban blight) while shifting population toward the center.
Proof: As before, let stars denote values under the amenity tax and hats denote the laissez-
faire equilibrium. With v00 < 0 and θ > 0 under the amenity tax, q∗
s < b qs must hold given
(12). Then, the RHS of (14) must be smaller under the amenity tax than in the laissez-faire
equilibrium, and since the same conclusion applies to the LHS, a∗q∗
c < b ab qc follows. But,
assuming k00 > 0, (7) then yields a∗ > b a, which implies q∗
c < b qc using the previous inequality.9
From (3), n∗
s < b ns then holds, and p∗
c > b pc follows as before.
The intuitive explanation of these results mirrors the congestion-pricing case. When an
amenity tax is imposed, the suburban housing price rises, causing population to shift toward the
center. The resulting increase in the central price pc increases the incentive for reinvestment,
reducing urban blight. Note that, as in the case of congestion pricing, the disposition of the
revenue from the open-space amenity tax is immaterial under the maintained assumption of
quasi-linear preferences.10
3.4. The eﬀects of impact fees
Suppose now that open-space amenities and traﬃc congestion are both absent, but that
infrastructure investment, which exhibits decreasing returns to scale, is required for suburban
housing development.11 The infrastructure cost per unit of land serviced is given by I(nsqs),
an increasing function of the developed suburban land area. Total infrastructure cost is then
nsqsI(nsqs).
15This cost must be included among the resource expenditures in the ﬁrst line of the La-
grangean expression (8) for the planning problem. When this modiﬁcation is made, the opti-
mality condition for qs becomes
v0(qs) = r + I(nsqs) + nsqsI0(nsqs). (15)
This condition shows that, not only must infrastructure cost per unit of land (I) be taken
into account along with r in the determination of qs, but the increase in cost per unit of land
resulting from a higher qs (and the resulting eﬀect on total cost, nsqsI0) must be considered
as well. Note that this is a congestion eﬀect like that in the traﬃc case, but one that operates
through the suburban land area rather than simply through population.
Traditionally, infrastructure is ﬁnanced through average-cost pricing, in which case a
builder would pay a tax equal to I(nsqs) per unit of land to the government. This cost
would in turn be passed on to the consumer as part of the housing price ps, which would then
equal r +I(nsqs). The ﬁrst-order condition (1) in the laissez-faire case would thus be replaced
by
v0(qs) = r + I(nsqs). (16)
To decentralize the social optimum, bringing the consumer’s condition in line with (15), the
average-cost-based tax in (16) must be replaced with a tax based on marginal cost, given by
last two terms in (15), which would instead be passed on to the consumer. This marginal-cost-
based tax is referred to as an “impact fee.”
Thus, in the equal-utility condition (11), r is replaced by r+I(nsqs) in the laissez-fare case
and by r + I(nsqs) + nsqsI0(nsqs) under the impact fee (with congestion absent, a constant t
replaces the commuting cost terms). But since these expressions are each set equal to v0(qs)
given (15) and (16), the equal-utility condition is the same in two cases and again can be
written as (14). Then, the following results can be established:
Proposition 3. With decreasing returns in infrastructure provision, the laissez-faire
equilibrium (with average-cost infrastructure pricing) has a lower level of reinvesment
16in central-city buildings and a larger suburban population than the social optimum.
Thus, imposition of an impact fee, which reﬂects marginal costs and hence achieves the
optimum, raises reinvestment (reducing urban blight) while shifting population toward
the center.
Proof: The argument proceeds by contradiction, focusing ﬁrst on the case where k00 > 0.
Accordingly, suppose that q∗
s ≥ b qs. Then, by (14), a∗q∗
c ≥ b ab qc must hold, so that satisfaction
of (7) requires a∗ ≤ b a, which implies q∗
c ≥ b qc using the previous inequality. Then, (3) yields
n∗
s ≥ b ns and thus n∗
sq∗
s ≥ b nsb qs. But, given q∗







s) ≤ I(b nsb qs), an impossibility given I0 > 0. Thus, q∗
s < b qs must hold, implying
a∗q∗
c < b ab qc, a∗ > b a by (7), and q∗
c < b qc. Then, (3) yields n∗
s < b ns, and p∗
c > b pc holds as before.
The k00 = 0 case is handled similarly.12
A ﬁnal point is that, since impact-fee revenue exceeds the cost of the infrastructure given
decreasing returns and marginal-cost pricing, the excess revenue must be redistributed. As
before, the disposition of the revenue has no eﬀect on the equilibrium.13
4. Alternate Anti-Sprawl Policies
The anti-sprawl policies considered above attack each distortion by eliminatingthe relevant
wedge between the optimality and equilibrium conditions, generating a new equilibrium that
is socially optimal. It is interesting, however, to consider whether other policies are capable of
supporting the optimum. As has been discussed in the literature, an urban growth boundary
(UGB) can sometimes be a perfect substitute for a price-based policy in controlling sprawl. In
the present context, a UGB speciﬁes an upper limit on the amount of land in the suburban
zone that may be developed for housing, thus constituting a quantity-based policy. Letting L
denote this land area, the UGB restriction is therefore
nsqs ≤ L. (17)
With the suburban land area restricted, the rent for developed land in the suburban zone
will no longer equal the opportunity cost r, taking instead some larger value. To understand
the new equilibrium conditions that determine this value, consider the model with open-space
17amenities. Letting e r denote the equilibrium suburban land rent, the ﬁrst-order condition (1)
is replaced by
v0(qs) = e r. (18)
The new conditions (17) and (18), along with the previousconditions (2)–(4) and (7), determine
equilibrium values for the endogenous variables under the UGB, which now include e r.
Similarly, in the model with infrastructure costs, the equilibrium condition (16) is replaced
by
v0(qs) = e r + I(nsqs). (19)
This condition in conjunction with (17), (2)–(4) and (7) determines the UGB equilibrium with
infrastructure costs, which may have a diﬀerent e r value than in the amenity model. The
following result establishes that a properly chosen UGB can support the social optimum in
both these models:
Proposition 4. Suppose that, under the UGB policy, L is set equal to n∗
sq∗
s in the
presence of either open-space amenities or underpriced infrastructure (n∗
sq∗
s generally
diﬀers between the two cases). Then, the UGB equilibrium coincides with the social
optimum. Thus, when the UGB enforces development of the socially optimal amount
of suburban land under either of these models, the overall equilibrium (including the
level of reinvesment in central-city buildings) is eﬃcient.
Proof: First, note that, since the laissez-faire equilibrium satisﬁes b nsb qs > n∗
sq∗
s under both
models, the constraint (17) will bind in both cases when L = n∗
sq∗
s. Then observe that the




c, a∗, and p∗
c when suburban rent equals e r = r + θN under the amenity model and when




s) under the infrastructure-cost model. Thus, the suburban rent premium
above r under the given UGB exactly equals the appropriate wedge from the other price-based
policies, accounting for the UGB’s eﬃciency.
The proposition thus shows that, in addition to limiting spatial expansion of the city,
a UGB also reduces urban blight, raising central-city reinvestment to an eﬃcient level. In
contrast to these results, however, a UGB cannot support the social optimum in the model with
18traﬃc congestion. This conclusion can be seen by recalling that the optimality condition for qs
under traﬃc congestion is the same as the laissez-faire equilibrium condition (1) (v0(qs) = r).
Therefore, since the congestion model with a UGB would have (17) as the corresponding
equilibrium condition (as in the amenity model), and since land rent e r will exceed r, the UGB
equilibrium cannot be optimal. This conclusion is illustrated by Brueckner (2007) in a more
realistic model with a continuum of residential locations. In his model, the UGB achieves only
a small fraction of the welfare gain generated by congestion pricing.
The problem with the UGB in the congestion context is its failure to achieve a suﬃcient in-
crease in central densities, as can be seen in Brueckner (2007). Suburban density is ineﬃciently
increased instead, with qs falling in the present model via the increase in land rent above the
opportunity cost r. While such suburban densiﬁcation in not optimal in the congestion case,
it is required under the two other models, accounting for the eﬃciency of the UGB in these
cases.
Given suboptimal reinvestment in central-city buildings in the laissez-faire equilibrium,
one might wonder whether subsidization of building maintenance could generate the social
optimum. Suppose that a subsidy of κ per unit of maintenance where introduced so as to raise
the level of a, with (7) then rewritten as v0(aqc) = k0(a) − κ. If κ were adjusted to achieve
a = a∗, it is clear that the associated value of qc from this modiﬁed equilibrium condition will
not equal q∗
c. Thus, a reinvestment subsidy cannot generate the social optimum.
5. The Eﬀects of Faster Population Growth
As explained above, the blight impact of the anti-sprawl policies arises through their in-
ducement of a redistribution of the (period-2) population toward the central zone. Given the
population distribution’s role in determining blight, it is interesting to explore a related issue:
the blight impact of faster growth in the city’s overall population between the initial period
and period 2 (namely, a larger in N). The expected impact of a higher N would appear to
be a reduction in blight, but an appropriate analysis is required. That analysis consists of a
comparative-static exercise involving N, but this exercise may give diﬀerent answers depend-
ing on the absence or presence of a market failure (as well as the nature of the failure). The
19following analysis assumes that, when a market failure is present, it is uncorrected.
Consider ﬁrst the impact of an increase in N in the presence of unpriced traﬃc congestion.
In this case, after deleting the term involving t0 and using (3), condition (11) can be written
v(aqc) − aqcv0(aqc) = v(qs) − rqs − t(N − 1/qc). (19)







qcv00t0 − (t0 − a2q3
cv00)k00 > 0, (20)
where the inequality uses v00 < 0 and k00 ≥ 0. Thus, the faster population growth associated
with a larger N raises central-city reinvestment, reducing blight. It can also be shown that the
derivative ∂qc/∂N is proportional to −∂a/∂N and thus negative (implying that the central
population nc rises). Given these impacts, ∂pc/∂N > 0 follows from (2) and (7).
If traﬃc congestion is absent but suburban infrastructure is underpriced, then (16) again
applies along with (14) and (7). To ﬁnd the impact of a larger N, ns in (16) is eliminated



















Therefore, as in the case of unpriced congestion, faster population growth in the presence
of underpriced infrastructure reduces blight. The derivative ∂qc/∂N is again proportional to
−∂a/∂N and negative, so that nc rises, and ∂pc/∂N > 0 also holds.
When the only distortion is open-space amenities, then (7) and (13) with θ = 0 (same
as (4)) jointly determine a and qc. Since N is absent from these equations, the solutions are
independent of N, implying no connection between the city’s population growth and blight.
In this case, the only eﬀect of a larger N is to raise ns, from (3). These same conclusions
also apply when none of the three market failures is present, given that a and qc are again
determined by (7) and (4).
20These latter conclusions may seem counterintuitive, given that a larger population in the
standard urban model raises the price of housing in the center, which would elicit more rein-
vestment in the current framework. However, the two-zone structure of the model leads to
a diﬀerent outcome. As long as congestion in commuting or infrastructure is absent, adding
population to the suburbs has no eﬀect on the relative attractiveness of the two zones. Given
the interzonal nature of commuting costs, these costs are no higher even though the average
suburban resident is farther from the CBD, and a parallel conclusion applies to infrastructure
costs. As a result, additional population can be accommodated in the suburbs with no eﬀect
on nc and pc. By contrast, when congestion is present, a larger suburban population raises
commuting or infrastructure costs, making the suburbs less attractive. Therefore, the overall
increase in population is accompanied by a shift toward the center, which raises pc and leads
to a reduction in blight.
Summarizing yields
Proposition 5. Faster population growth (a higher N) reduces blight in the presence
of unpriced traﬃc congestion or underpriced suburban infrastructure. However, popu-
lation growth has no blight impact under open-space amenities or in the absence of the
three market failures.
6. Conclusion
This paper argues that urban sprawl and urban blight result from the same underlying
economic process, both being responses to fundamental market failures aﬀecting urban land
markets. The analysis shows that distortions commonly identiﬁedas causes of ineﬃcientspatial
expansion of urban areas (unpriced traﬃc congestion, uninternalized open-space externalities,
and underpriced suburban infrastructure) also cause an ineﬃcient shortfall in housing rein-
vestment and maintenance in the central city. Adoption of corrective policies shifts population
toward the center, improving reinvestmentincentivesand thus reducing urban blight. However,
it is important to note that the paper considers only one aspect of a very large issue. Poverty
and neighborhood externalities are important causes of the problem of urban blight, and these
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∗We thank the Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics at UC Berkeley for
ﬁnancial support and are grateful to Kangoh Lee and David Pines for comments.
1See Richardson and Gordon (2001) and Bruegmann (2005) for a critical summary of the
arguments.
2For a related survey on sprawl that emphasizes public-ﬁnance forces in explaining sprawl,
see Nechyba and Walsh (2004). For documentation of the sprawl phenomenon using satellite
imagery, see Burchﬁeld, Overman, Puga and Turner (2006).
3These ideas have been extended in more-recent research on neighborhood dynamics, which
includes papers by Bond and Coulson (1989), Aaronson (2001) and Rosenthal (2007).
4See Wheaton (1998) and Brueckner (2007) for earlier analyses of the spatial eﬀects of con-
gestion pricing and Brueckner (1997) for an analysis of impact fees.
5In their analysis of congestion pricing, Anas and Pines (2007, 2008) assume a similar struc-
ture, although in the second paper, the central land area is set at zero, with a bridge
eﬀectively connecting the suburbs to the CBD.
6Note that in this case, central residents receive toll revenue even though they incur no cost
from tolls. A similar outcome occurs in Brueckner’s (2007) model, which has a continuum
of locations and equal toll redistribution even though toll payments diﬀer across residents.
For a related paper, see Wheaton (1998).
7With income eﬀects now present, the distribution of the toll revenue as well as landownership
arrangements matter in determining the urban equilibrium. The analysis of the Cobb-
Douglas case assumes absentee landownership and government retention of the toll revenue
(or its distribution to landownwers).
8Note that ` + 1 can be viewed as the land area of the region containing the city. Holding
consumption ﬁxed, consumers are happier when more of the region consists of open space.
9Note that if k00 = 0, then a∗q∗
c < b ab qc is inconsistent with satisfaction of (7), ruling out the
case of constant marginal maintenance costs.
2510It can be shown that Proposition 2 also holds under Cobb-Douglas preferences.
11Central infrastructure was built in period 0 and can thus be ignored in the period-1 analysis.
12When k00 = 0, (7) reduces to v0(aqc) = κ for some constant κ, and it follows that a∗q∗
c =
b ab qc = z, where z is some constant. From (14), q∗







s) = I(b nsb qs). Given q∗
s = b qs and I0 > 0, it follows that n∗
s < b ns. Eq.
(3) then implies q∗
c < b qc, and since a∗q∗
c = b ab qc, a∗ > b a must hold. Finally, p∗
c > b pc holds as
before.
13It can be shown that Proposition 3 also holds under Cobb-Douglas preferences.
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